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Between Interdependence and Strategic 
Interests 
EU-Russia Relations after the Georgian War
VASILE ROTARU1
Introduction
December 2011 marked the 20th anniversary of ”the greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe” of the last century, as Vladimir Putin, described the collapse of the Soviet 
Union; and the 20th anniversary of the Kremlin’s struggle for regaining its previous 
great power status. Since 1991 Moscow has not ceased to consider that the West took 
advantage of its weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to reconfigure 
the European continent according to Western interests2, and has been trying to regain 
its previously influential position. Within this context, it is unsurprising that the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Russian Federation until 2020, ratified by 
Dmitri Medvedev in May 2009, clearly specifies that Russia aims to play an important 
role in the world together with the US, China and other great powers and to act as a 
hegemon in the post-Soviet space.
However, Moscow is afraid of remaining alone in the international arena and 
needs good relations with the EU for its economic development, the credibility of its 
foreign policy, and the security of the region. In political terms, Russia is dependent on 
the EU. To be acknowledged as an important power in the international community, 
the Kremlin needs to be recognized by the West3, and as Russia’s relations with 
the USA are not often the best, the European Union represents its guarantor on the 
international arena.
This necessity may explain why during the Georgian war Russia was 
incomparably more open for mediation by the European Union rather than any other 
international body or external player (in particular NATO, OSCE, the United States). 
Moscow reacted positively to the proposal of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and 
ultimately agreed to a solution that ended the August 2008 war4. The decision to 
accept France as an interlocutor conformed to Russia’s overall approach toward 
the EU as a counterweight to the USA, as Moscow suffers from a security deficit in 
relations with NATO and the United States, considering the EU a potential pole in the 
1  Vasile Rotaru is beneficiary of the ”Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” 
project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral 
Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013. 
2  Marc-Antoine EYL-MAZZEGA, ”Les relations entre l’Union Européene et la Russie: 
l’amorce d’un parteneriat de raison?”, January 2010, http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/
themes/ue/articles/art_maem.pdf (accessed May 2012).
3  Tom CASIER, ”The Rise of Energy to the Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From 
interdependence to Dependence?”, Geopolitics, vol. 16, no. 3, 2011, pp. 536-552/p. 543.
4  Irina KOBRINSKAYA, ”Russia and the European Union. A Keystone Relationship”, 
Documentos Cidob Europa 6, Ed. Cidob, Barcelona, 2009, p. 21.
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new multipolar order1. Furthermore, the Mistral deal demonstrates that Russia has 
opened a new phase in relations with Western Europe. The cost of the Mistral ships 
seems to be a low price that Russia is willing to pay for its political success, in the 
context of the atmosphere of mistrust in its relations with the West2.
The question that remains is: how far is Russia willing to go in terms of improving 
its relations with the EU?
Improving the Image Abroad
After the Georgian war, Russia needed to improve both its image and relations 
with the European Union. The August 2008 events came as a shock for the West. The 
war questioned the reliability of the Kremlin on the international arena bringing back 
especially to the former communist countries memory the ”Brezhnev Doctrine”. It 
was for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Russia invaded an 
independent state and the first war between two members of the Council of Europe. 
Within this context, Moscow needed to clean up its image abroad and reassure the EU 
member states about its good intentions. And Russia started with Central and Eastern 
European EU members. This was very deliberate, bearing in mind that in 2008 it was 
Poland and Lithuania that blocked the negotiations of the new EU-Russia Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement. 
Vladimir Putin seems to have realized that without normal Polish-Russian 
relations there cannot be normal relations with the EU as a whole3. Therefore, the 
Russian Prime Minister came to Poland in 2009 to attend the solemn ceremony 
commemorating the 70th anniversary of the start of World War II. After that, Putin 
invited Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to come to Katyn in April 2010 for a 
joint ceremony to honor the death of Polish officers 70 years previously. Putin even 
kneeled, briefly, while laying a wreath to the memorial, a gesture that was much 
appreciated4.
Polish-Russian relations were put to the severest test three days later, when the 
Polish presidential plane crashed at Smolensk. For the first time in living memory, 
Russia declared a national day of mourning to honor the foreign dead5. President 
Medvedev went to the funeral and clearly named Stalin as responsible for the murders 
at Katyn. Moscow did not react to the accusations made by some Poles that it might 
have been involved in the Smolensk air crash. And, eventually, Russia was pleased 
with the last Polish elections results.
1  Jakub KULHANEK, ”The Fundamentals of Russia’s EU Policy”, Problems of Post-
communism, vol. 57, no. 5, September/October 2010, p. 55.
2  Piotr ZOCHOWSKI, ”Russia’s Interest in the Mistral: The Political and Military Aspects”, 
OSW Commentary, issue 41, October 2010, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, p. 4.
3  Дмитрий ТРЕНИН, ”Как менялась внешняя политика современной России, 1992-2010”, 
http://russia-2020.org/2010/10/06/russian-foreign-policy-perspective-2020/ (accessed January 
2012).
4  Dmitri TRENIN, ”Russia and Poland: A Friendship that Must not Fail”, December 2010, 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-poland-friendship-dec-446.cfm (accessed January 
2012).
5  Ibidem. 
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As well as its moves to improve its image, Moscow has also made progress in 
other domains. Thus, considering that the most important issue of disagreement 
between Russia and the EU and an essential element of the PCA agreement1 represents 
the respect for human rights, Russia has ratified Protocol 14 of the Convention of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, 
Russia has been the last to ratify, after four years of hesitation. The delay was widely 
interpreted as a blocking tactic, undermining the Court from functioning effectively, 
which would mean undermining the cause of human rights in Europe2. 
The gesture has not led to major changes for Russian citizens though. As the 
recent parliamentary elections and Putin’s candidacy for third presidential term 
showed, the Kremlin is not willing to really democratize the country. Russia usually 
makes some concessions for pleasing Western partners, however, when is criticized 
for the lack of democracy, the Kremlin keeps underlining that Russia builds on its 
own traditions and will develop them in its own way at its own pace3. The concept 
of ”sovereign democracy”, introduced by the Kremlin’s ideolog Vladislav Surkov, 
in 2005 is the strongest argument of Russian leaders when accused of disrespect for 
human rights and rule of law. It is the cornerstone of Russian geopolitical status and 
domestic stability because it allows Russia to counter Western criticism and determine 
its own political future without outside interference4. This concept allowed president 
Medvedev during the last EU-Russia summit to answer to press questions about the 
critics on Duma elections, that ”[The European Parliament] means nothing to me… 
The European Parliament should deal with internal issues because the EU has a lot 
of problems of its own”5. 
Even if the EU-Russia relationship is built on the assumption of the existing 
foundation of similar values and goals between the parties6, Russia is insisting on 
its sovereign right to pick and choose the right combination of reforms as well as 
deciding on how best to implement the reforms to suit its own needs. The Foreign 
Policy Concept is full of references to the importance of preserving, enhancing and 
buttressing Russian sovereignty7. Therefore, with a democratic constitution but with a 
”personal” interpretation of the rule of law, there is no wonder that in the Economist’s 
Democracy Index 2011, Russia was downgraded from the hybrid regime in 2010, on 
107 place to authoritarian state on 117 place in 20118. 
1  Hiski HAUKKALA, The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership. The Limits of Post-sovereignty in 
International Relations, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-poland-friendship-dec-446.
cfm Routledge, 2010, p. 84.
2  Michael EMERSON, ”Russia in Europe and the West”, April 2010, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, http://www.ceps.eu/book/russia-europe-and-west (accessed December 
2011).
3  Roger E. KANET, Russia. Re-emerging Great Power, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 15-16.
4  Donacha O BEACHAIN, Abel POLESE, The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet 
Republics. Successes and Failures, Routledge, 2010 p. 142.
5  Andrew RETTMAN, ”Russian President: EU’s Parliament Means Nothing”, The 
EuObserver, December 15, 2011, http://euobserver.com/24/114655 (accessed December 2011).
6  Hiski HAUKKALA, The EU-Russia… cit., p. 2.
7  Ibidem, p. 105.
8  Economist Intelligence Unit, ”Democracy Index 2011”, The Economist, 2011, http://
www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_Final_Dec_2011.
pdf&mode=wp (accessed January 2012).
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Asymmetric Interdependence?
Apart from the issue of human rights and rule of law, energy relations with Russia 
give EU’s leaders the biggest headaches. This state of fact is rooted in the importance 
of the ”mighty energy sector” for Russian internal and external policy. For Moscow 
the revenues form oil and gas industry ensures the stability of political regime and 
represents the main instrument of its geopolitical influence. The ”energodiplomacy” 
emerged since the first Putin’s presidential term and dominates the EU-Russia 
relations.
As a basic feature, the EU-Russian energy relations are characterized by a strong 
mutual dependence. Russia is the EU’s biggest energy supplier and the EU is Russia’s 
biggest trading partner. However, even the Kremlin has been trying to increase 
Europe’s dependence on its energy, Russia needs the EU more than Brussels needs 
Moscow. While some member states are unduly dependent on Russian energy, and a 
few alarmingly so (ex. Finland, the Baltic states, Bulgaria), the EU as a whole does not 
suffer from excessive dependency upon Russia. The Russian fuels exported to the EU 
represent over three quarters of all its exports, for the EU, though, these constitute a 
bit less than one third of its total energy imports needs1. In these conditions, the EU 
would be able to withstand any interruption in imports of crude oil or natural gas from 
Russia because the EU’s energy consumption can be replaced by other energy sources 
(nuclear, renewable, liquefied gas) and suppliers (increased imports of Norwegian, 
Middle East, Nigerian gas or increased imports of Saudi oil). Russia’s position would 
be more vulnerable if the EU reduced its purchases of Russian oil and gas. In this 
scenario, Russia would be threatened with financial collapse due to its inability to 
replace lost revenue2. This mutual dependence between Russia and Europe has meant 
that Russia’s energy weapon has, in actuality, turned out to be less potent that some 
in the Kremlin may have hoped and that many Europeans feared3.
There is no doubt that the January 2009 Ukrainian gas crisis, Russia’s withdrawal 
from the Energy Treaty, the Arab revolts in North Africa, and the Japanese earthquake, 
tsunami and nuclear accident, which called into question the reliability of nuclear 
energy, put pressure on the security of European energy, however, the EU is trying 
to overcome these challenges. Thus, in order to reduce its import vulnerability, in 
November 2010, the European Commission adopted the ten-year Energy plan entitled, 
Energy 2020: A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy. The Commission’s 
objectives for 2020 are to increase the share of renewable energy to 20% and to make 
a 20% improvement in energy efficiency. As the large EU members of Western Europe 
are less dependent on Russian imports, while the countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe have fewer alternatives and are from 70 to 99% dependent on gas and oil 
imports from Russia, the strategy involves the obligation of solidarity among member 
states, internal infrastructure and interconnections across external borders and 
1  Polish-Russian Group of Difficult Matters, ”Rethinking EU-Russia Relationship”, Interim 
Report, The Center for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding, Brussels, November 2011, 
p. 5.
2  Lukas TICHY, ”Energy Security in the EU-Russia Relations”, Institute of International 
Relations, Prague, 2010, p. 6.
3  Jeffrey MANKOFF, Russian Foreign Policy. The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, INC, New York 2009, p. 178.
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maritime areas. This way, the gas could circulate in case of crisis, in order to be able to 
be transferred from one country to another. The EU will put an important accent on the 
modernization of the existing infrastructure, with specific emphasis on the Southern 
corridor, in particular Nabucco and ITGI. Europe has also found different sources of 
energy in Qatar and even in the USA, countries which could export liquefied gas. In 
January 2011, the EU and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on natural gas supplies, 
which commits Azerbaijan to selling ”substantial volumes of gas over the long term” 
to the EU1. The agreement represents the first firm commitment from a Caspian Basin 
country to provide gas for the EU’s Southern Corridor.
Moscow perceives this EU policy as a threat to its energy security2 and has reacted 
defensively. The termination of Russia’s provisional application of the Energy Charter 
Treaty came two weeks after the signing of the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement. 
(Moscow is afraid of losing its gas transportation monopoly and the ratification 
would have undercut Gazprom’s position on the European market by forcing Russia 
to open up its network to cheaper gas from Central Asia.) A week after the signing 
of the EU-Azerbaijan agreement on the Southern Corridor, Gazprom announced that 
it would increase the amount of gas it purchases from Azerbaijan, in order to make 
the European project nonviable because of lack of sufficient hydrocarbons reserves. 
Russia has been also trying to diversify its energy exports and reduce its dependence 
on the European Union by opening an Asian route to Chinese, Korean and Japanese 
markets. Gazprom is trying to sell gas to China, but the negotiations on exports have 
been taking place for several years without success so far. Thus, Russia remains 
dependent on the EU. On one hand, the gas is usually transported through pipelines 
and Russian transport infrastructure is oriented towards Europe, exporting to new 
markets requiring expensive new pipelines and advance planning, and on the other 
hand, the EU is the most lucrative market for Russia (Gazprom gets nearly 70% of 
its profits from sales to the EU)3. Moreover, Russia encounters further problems with 
regard to the Chinese market. The communist neighbours are not willing to pay as 
much as are paying the Europeans for Russian gas and oil, and the demographic 
discrepancies between rarified Siberia and crowded China are not at all comfortable 
for Russian leaders. ”Vladivostok is already a Chinese city, both economically and 
culturally. The Chinese make up more than half the population of Khabarovsk”4. 
Russia now seems understandably to be more preoccupied with the exposure of the 
thinly populated Far East to the rising power of China. Beijing’s growing involvement 
in Central Asia (including the launch of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China 
via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and Turkmenistan’s thriving cooperation with Iran, 
have seriously limited Gazprom’s ability to have Central Asian gas at its disposal5. 
Furthermore, Moscow fears being marginalized in a world where power and wealth 
1  Bruce PANNIER, ”Azerbaijan Supply Agreement Pumps New Life into EU’s Energy 
Plans”, Radio Free Europe, January 13, 2011, http://www.rferl.org (accessed March 2012).
2  Lukas TICHY, ”Energy Security in…cit.”, p. 21.
3  Kim TALUS, Piero Luigi FRATINI, EU-Russia Energy Relations, Euroconfidenciel, 
Brussels, 2010, p. 33.
4  Katinka BARYSCH, Christopher COCKER, Leszek JESIEN, EU-Russia Relations. Time for 
A Realistic Turnaround, Centre for European Studies, Brussels, 2011, p. 25.
5  Ewa PASZYC, ”Nord and South Stream Won’t Save Gazprom”, OSW Commentary, 
issue 35, January 28, 2010, Centre for Eastern Studies, p. 3, www.osw.waw.pl (accessed January 
2012). 
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oscillate between Asia and the Pacific and needs powerful allies as a counter-balance 
to Chinese power. Thus, at least in the medium term, Russia is ”condemned” to be 
EU’s partner in the energy field.
The asymmetric interdependency is more obvious in trade area. The EU is the 
most important Russian commercial partner, while Russia is ranked third among the 
EU’s trading partners, after the USA and China. More than half of Russia’s trade 
is conducted with EU states, and 75% of foreign direct investments in Russia come 
from the EU1. On the other side, the EU’s exports to Russia represent up to 6% of its 
total value exports, while its imports from Russia are around 10%2. It is obvious that 
Russia is dependent on the EU and not vice versa3. And this dependency on trade, 
especially energy trade with the EU will increase, given the new and future projects 
(Nord Stream – to Germany and South Stream to the Balkans). Russia has sought 
to enhance its leverage over Europe through the construction of new pipelines and 
to direct the asymmetric interdependence to its advantage, that is to make Europe 
more dependent on Russia than Russia is on the EU, however, these pipelines not 
only increase the sheer quantity of oil and gas Russia can export to Europe, but also 
increase Russia’s dependency on European market.
The Russian economy is considerably dependent on the EU economy for its 
export, of which 60% goes to the EU. In the hypothetical case where trade between the 
EU and Russia would come to a complete standstill, Russian economy would simply 
collapse4. On the other side, the European Union is the largest single market in the 
world, which gives the EU and especially to the European Commission some leverage 
on Russia5. Brussels should not be intimidated by Russia’s ”energodiplomacy” when 
negotiating, in fact the Kremlin recognized its need to be part of the market economies 
club by becoming member of the World Trade Organization, and now has to comply 
with the international rules.
Modernization without Democratization?
Russia considers itself a great power. The soaring oil and gas prices have 
provided enough money for strengthening states institutions and ensured a degree 
of prosperity for Russian citizens. However, the energy resources have proved to be 
both blessing and curse for the country. Bewitched by the huge revenues from the 
sale of hydrocarbons, Russian authorities refused to see the real needs of the country. 
The effects: the aftermath of the Georgian war provided just how fragile Russian 
prosperity was; the stock market lost close to half its total value in barely a month, 
and trading had to be halted repeatedly in the autumn of the 2008 to avoid greater 
damage. With the beginning of global recession oil prices dropped from over $140 
a barrel, to bellow $506, Russia realizing that its economy, based on the export of 
1  Jaroslaw CWIEK-KAPROVICZ, ”Russia’s Vision of Relations with the European Union”, 
Bulletin, no. 82, May 2010, The Polish Institute of International Affairs.
2  Polish-Russian Group of Difficult Matters, ”Rethinking EU-Russia…cit.”, p. 5.
3  Katinka BARYSCH, Christopher COCKER, Leszek JESIEN, EU-Russia Relations…cit., 
p. 30.
4  Tom CASIER, ”The Rise of Energy to...cit.”, p. 542.
5  Hiski HAUKKALA, The EU-Russia… cit., p. 46.
6  Jeffrey MANKOFF, Russian Foreign Policy…cit., p. 304.
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raw materials (oil, gas, steel) cannot be sustainable. Putin remembers that the Soviet 
Union collapsed with the fall of the oil price on world market, in the middle ’80s and 
that post-Soviet Russia was on the verge of collapse in the beginning of ’90’s, when 
the fuel price fell again down to 10$!1 An economy based on export of hydrocarbons 
cannot guarantee the security of the country, thus, the necessity of modernizing was 
required. And Putin acknowledged it even earlier when, in 2006, told the Security 
Council that ”the level of military security depends directly on the pace of economic 
growth and technological development”2. The need of economic modernization 
became though one of the top priorities of Medvedev policy: 
”Creating favorable external conditions for the modernization of Russia, 
transformation of its economy through innovation, enhancement of living 
standards, consolidation of society, strengthening of the foundations of the 
constitutional system, rule of law and democratic institutions, realization 
of human rights and freedoms and, as a consequence, ensuring national 
competitiveness in a globalizing world”3.
The modernization of the country was urgently needed. Russian economy is 
inefficient: it consumes as much as three times more energy per unit of production 
than the EU or Japan4. To develop its economy, Russia needs advanced machinery and 
technology even for the extraction of raw materials. Such machinery can be found 
in the West and predominantly in Europe. Within this context, the importance of 
Russia’s relationship with the EU has grown.
The EU needs Russia to be prosperous, stable and at peace with itself and its 
neighbours, a chaotic, angry and unstable Russia being a risk to EU security and 
prosperity5. Thus, during the EU-Russia summit at Rostov-on-Don, May 31-June 
1 2010, as a response to Moscow’s needs, the EU launched the Partnership for 
Modernization. The agreement promotes a sustainable low-carbon economy and 
energy efficiency, and cooperation in innovation, research and development. The EU 
hopes that the Partnership will lead to political liberalization in Russia in addition to 
economic growth. As Katinka Barysh put it 
”indirectly a modernization partnership could contribute to EU’s ultimate aim: 
to make Russia more democratic, accountable and open. In the medium term, 
successful modernization could help to transform apathetic Russian middle class 
into an entrepreneurial class that demands property rights and civil liberties”6.
For the EU only a democratic Russia, which conforms to the rule of law, can be 
a reliable partner. That is why the EU’s interests toward Russia lie in the spheres of 
1  Michael STÜRMER, Putin şi noua Rusie, Romanian transl. by Alexandru Suter, Editura 
Litera, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 72.
2  Jeffrey MANKOFF, Russian Foreign Policy…cit., p. 33.
3  Ibidem, p. 13.
4  Polish-Russian Group of Difficult Matters, ”Rethinking EU-Russia…cit.”, p. 5.
5  Ibidem, p. 58.
6  Katinka BARYSCH, ”The EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization”, The EU-Russia 
center review, issue 15, October 2010, p. 28.
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deep transformation, Westernization and cooperation1. However, Moscow seems to 
be more interested in a narrower modernization plan, focused mainly on technology 
transfer, support for innovative industries and other state-led interventions without 
social, political, and economic reforms. Moscow insists that primarily economic 
purposes should be incorporated into the EU-Russia modernization partnership, 
as Russian officials made it clear: The Partnership for Modernization ”should direct 
attention to practical questions rather than to benefits of European values”, declared 
Vladimir Chizov, Russia’s EU representative being supported by Sergei Lavrov, the 
Russian foreign minister: ”We intend to give precedence to the most concrete and 
significant questions, including the economy, social problems, education, science, 
technology, innovation”2. 
However, can the modernization of the country take place without demo ]
cratization? Can you have business development without a democratic legal 
framework? Contrary to all the rhetoric during Putin’s and Medvedev’s tenure 
of office, the problem of corruption has significantly increased, rather than lessened. 
This is no doubt, a barrier to modernization because corruption is anathema to fair 
competition and it removes potential investment funds from the economy3. Thus, 
according to Transparency International, Russia was in 2010 on the place 154 (out of 
a total of 178) on the organization’s corruption index4.
The lack of democratic reforms, the disrespect for human rights and rule of law 
create another important obstruction in the way of modernization of the country: 
human capital flight. About a million and a half Russians are estimated to have 
emigrated in the last three years. Research and development efforts suffer from 
significant ”brain drain”. Russian talent prefers to go abroad rather than stay at home 
not primarily because of money but because of the freedom, opportunities and better 
life style they are able to enjoy in Europe and the United States5.
Moreover, Kremlin’s obstinacy of not complying with democratic principles is, 
contrary to the four ”common spaces”. At the EU-Russian St. Petersburg Summit in 
May 2003, Brussels and Moscow agreed to reinforce their cooperation by creating four 
long term ”common spaces” in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement and on the basis of common values and shared interests: the common 
economic space, covering economic issues and the environment; the common space 
of freedom, security and justice; the common space of external security, including 
crisis management and non-proliferation; and the common space of research and 
education, which includes cultural aspects. Without respecting its commitments 
Moscow cannot be taken as a reliable partner for the EU. 
Within this context, there is no wonder why the negotiations for the new PCA 
are difficult. Russia avoids entering into firm legal relations with the EU, instead 
1  Scott Nicholas ROMANIUK, ”Rethinking EU-Russia Relations: ’modern’ cooperation 
or ’post modern’ strategic partnership”, CEJISS, issue 2, 2009, p. 71, http://www.cejiss.org/ 
(accessed December 2011).
2  Hannes ADOMELT, ”Russia’s ’Partnerships for Modernization’: Origins, Content and 
Prospects”, The EU-Russia Center Review, issue 19, October 2011, p. 41.
3  Ibidem, p. 48.
4  Transparency International, ”Corruption Perception Index 2010 Results”, http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed January 2012).
5  Hannes ADOMELT, ”Russia’s ’Partnerships…cit.”, p. 49.
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preferring a wide-open legal frame generating loose obligations1. Medvedev argues 
for replacing the old PCA with an essentially technical agreement focusing primarily 
on economic cooperation, while Europeans favor a more detailed arrangements 
with special emphasis on energy and security issues. Many Eastern Europeans 
also want that the agreement to be focused on human rights and Russia’s relations 
with neighbouring (non-EU) states such as Georgia, inserting a clause into the EU 
negotiators’ instructions that resolving the ”frozen conflicts” around Russia’s borders 
should be a priority in EU-Russia relations2. 
The terms of the Agreement mean that Russia stops shorts of becoming part of 
the community of European values, especially when political pluralism, rule of law, 
and freedom of speech are considered. Russia may induce the idea that Brussels is 
delaying the signing of a new Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PAC 2). However, 
the key is in Moscow’s hands. The EU cannot and should not accept PAC 2 without 
taking into consideration that for Russia the four common spaces are pure talk. If 
Brussels does not put more pressure on Moscow to respect democratic values, and to 
make domestic changes Russia cannot become part of the community of European 
values. Its participation in the European integration process will only be superficial. 
As Andreas Umland has articulated, Russia’s authoritarian regime will instead 
”…continue to require confrontation with the West and in particular with the 
United States in order to legitimize its continuing existence and the lack of 
popular control of the government” 3.
Divide et impera
One of the main challenge of the European Union is its own disunity4. Special 
relations of some old EU members with Moscow, the fears of communist past of newer 
member states, the differences of perception of Russian foreign policy, all these create 
divergences inside Europe and enables the Kremlin to undermine the EU’s unity. 
Russia prefers legally binding comprehensive bilateral relations with the EU member 
states rather than with the EU as a whole5. This tactic corresponds to two basic 
principles of its foreign policy. On the one hand bilateral state-to-state relations have 
the advantage, from the Russia’s point of view, of avoiding the creation of intrusive 
behavioral norms while preserving state’s sovereign equality6 (states can at least be 
expected to act in their national interest and to be less moralistic about democracy, 
1  Igor YURGENS, ”The Objectives and the Price of modernization in Russia”, The EU-
Russia Center Review, issue 15, October 2010, p. 21.
2  Jeffrey MANKOFF, Russian Foreign Policy…cit., p. 160. 
3  Andreas UMLAND, ”EU and NATO Policies on Eastern Europe: Contradictory or 
Complementary?”, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110610/164548767.html (accessed April 
2012).
4  Marc LEONARD, Nicu POPESCU, ”A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations”, European 
Council of Foreign Relations, November 2007, p. 1.
5  Igor YURGENS, ”The Objectives and…cit.”, p. 21.
6  Jeffrey MANKOFF, Russian Foreign Policy…cit., p. 14.
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human rights, and so on than the EU as a whole1), and on the other hand, as Moscow 
prefers to portray itself as one of the Great Powers in Europe, it prefers to conduct its 
business with its equals – mainly Britain, France and Germany – while sidelining the 
EU institutions and smaller member states in the process if it can2. This bilateralism is 
clearly stated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation: 
”The development of mutually advantageous bilateral relationships with 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and 
some other West-European States is an important resource for promoting Russia’s 
national interests in the European and world affairs” 3
and is part of traditional international relations based on material interests and 
bargaining. 
”But Russia can hardly be blamed for such behavior when some in Europe appear 
to invite it, and fail to deliver a unified message”4. Leonard and Popescu have identified 
five distinct policy approaches to Russia within the EU member states: ”Trojan Horses” 
(Cyprus and Greece), which are defenders of Russian interests in the EU, ”Strategic 
Partners” (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), that have a ‘special relationship’ 
with Russia, ”Friendly Pragmatists” (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) with a close relationship 
with Russia and tending to put their business interests above political goals, ”Frosty 
Pragmatists” (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who focus on business interests but are 
less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behavior on human rights or other 
issues to respect the rule of law, and ”New Cold Warriors” (Lithuania and Poland) with 
an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow5. This disunity of EU members makes the 
EU-Russia negotiations very slow and complicated, which only serves to encourage 
the bilateral agreements.
The growth of bilateral arrangements, however, has on the whole increased 
Russian bargaining leverage, allowing Kremlin to play different European states 
against one another and limiting the range of issues where Russia finds itself 
confronting a solid European bloc6. This is the most obvious when we talk about 
energy field. Therefore, EU member states should be aware of the strength of the 
unity if they want to be more capable of ensuring their interests by negotiating with 
Russia. The bilateral temptation only discourage Russia to adopt a European policy 
while consolidating the old Russia’s instinct to move its agenda and increase its own 
security by dividing the Euro-Atlantic West7. 
1  Ibidem, p. 156.
2  Hiski HAUKKALA, The EU-Russia…cit., p. 108.
3  The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Kontzeptziya vneshney politiki 
Rossisyskoy Federatzyi), http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc3257
5d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument, (accessed January 2012).
4  Speech by Peter MANDELSON, ”Russia and the EU”, EU-Russia Centre, Brussels, 17 
October 2007, SPEECH/07/629, in Marc LEONARD, Nicu POPESCU, ”A Power Audit of…cit.”, 
p. 58.
5  Marc LEONARD, Nicu POPESCU, ”A Power Audit of…cit.”, p. 2.
6  Jeffrey MANKOFF, Russian Foreign Policy…cit., p. 151. 
7  Igor YURGENS, ”The Objectives and…cit.”, p. 22.
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On the other side, Russia claims that she does not want, that “somebody (the 
USA) again takes the decision for Europe”1 and wants to create a counter-balance to 
”the NATO-centrism” in Europe, by establishing a pan-European security system. 
However, the Kremlin should keep in mind that 21 European states are members of 
both NATO and the EU. This indicates that there are significant overlaps and that the 
differences between the policies of these two organizations are of a tactical rather than 
a strategic nature. When politicians or diplomats from non-Western countries meet 
with official representatives from key member states of both organizations, these are 
often the same people2.
A Common Neighbourhood
By ”common neighbourhood” we refer to the six former Soviet republics residing 
between the EU and the Russian Federation: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. This designation appeared after the launch of the ENP and 
meets the Kremlin’s view. Russia refused to become part of the ENP and demanded 
an equal partnership status to the EU, and by recognizing explicitly that the EU and 
Russia belong to each other’s neighbourhood, Russia is recognized as a fully equal 
of the EU3. 
The ”common neighbourhood” has a great importance for the security of the 
EU and Russia, their prosperity and stability being essential in this regard. Both 
actors have a huge impact on the ”countries in between”, they both have interests in 
area and they both are sources of ”carrots and sticks” affecting domestic politics and 
policies in these states4. Though, Russia and the EU have different approaches toward 
the ”common neighbourhood”. While the EU has a clear interest in stability in these 
countries, and involves them more closely in the European integration process and 
its trade regime, Russia has a clear interest in keeping the states in this area relatively 
weak and isolated, in order to maintain its dominance5. Russia is trying to maintain 
or re-create a traditional ”sphere of influence”, that gives Moscow a droit de regard 
over its former republics. A ”liberal empire”, with the strategic tasks of re-engaging 
Russia as the economic and cultural ”natural and unique leader” of the CIS seems 
to be close to Russian approach towards former Soviet republics. This notion was 
introduced in 2003 by Anatoly Chubais, Russia’s former privatization head and today 
the head of the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation, and was described not as an 
attempt to restore the former Soviet Union but as a new project guided by the liberal 
values of democracy, market economy and economic cooperation, where the means 
would be Russian culture, Russian business, and support of freedom, human rights 
and democracy6. Surprisingly or not, this description is very similar to that given by 
1  Doris WYDRA, Helga PUZL, ”Democracy, Security and Energy: the Russian-EU 
Relationship”, SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference: September 9-11, 
2010.
2  Andreas UMLAND, ”EU and NATO Policies…cit”.
3  Tom CASIER, ”The Rise of Energy to…cit.”, p. 87.
4  Ibidem, p. 75.
5  Ibidem, p. 88.
6  Bertil NYGREN, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia. Putin’s Foreign Policy towards the CIS 
Countries, Routledge, 2008, p. 225.
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Putin to Eurasian Union project, in the article published on October 3, 2011, in the 
Izvestia newspaper: 
”We are not talking about re-creating the Soviet Union […] The Eurasian alliance 
will be based on universal principles of integration, as an integral part of greater 
Europe, united by common values of freedom, democracy and market laws”1.
The return of this expansionist rhetoric is not random at all. In fact the similarities 
between Chubais’ concept and the Eurasian Union project support the assessment 
of the European Parliament rapporteur for the new EU-Russia Agreement, Hannes 
Swoboda, that Putin’s project is a ”reflection at least of defensive act of defending what 
they think is ’interference in their sphere of interests’”2. The hypothesis that Russia 
is afraid of loosing influence in the former Soviet territories and seems to perceive 
the Eastern Partnership as a challenge for its foreign policy goals fits perfectly in this 
context. Russia is still trapped in the old ways of thinking, perceiving the West as a 
threat3. The traditional approach of Russian security thinking reflects Russia’s fears 
that the country is encircled by enemies and, thus, that it needs to seek allies and 
create buffer zones or a ”liberal empire” against dangers4. 
By ”spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing 
with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human 
rights”5 in the Eastern partners, the EU provide an authentic democratization of the 
region, reinforcing the six states, treating them as independent entities not as pawns 
organically connected to Russia6. Furthermore, through the Eastern Partnership, the 
EU demonstrated that the Europeanization process would not be limited by 2007 
enlargement limits and that the Eastern borders are becoming more porous. ”[The 
EU made] it clear that we are not stopping at the border but we want to enlarge the 
influence in a democratic way. I mean a way of offering not of putting pressure”7. This 
situation is a real challenge for the Kremlin, as ”the reorientation of the post-Soviet 
states toward Europe does not present a threat to the military or economic security 
of Russia, but it does present a serious modernization challenge to Moscow”8. As, for 
1  Владимир Путин, ”Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое 
рождается сегодня”, Известия, October 3, 2011, http://www.izvestia.ru/news/502761 (accessed 
October 2011).
2  Hannes Swoboda (Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Rapporteur 
for the new EU-Russia Agreement). 2011. Interviewed by the author. Tape recording, December 
8. The European Parliament, Brussels.
3  Katinka BARYSCH, Christopher COCKER, Leszek JESIEN, EU-Russia Relations…cit., 
p. 14.
4  Marcel de HAAS, ”Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment”, Russian 
Analytical Digest, no. 62, June 2009, p. 4.
5  A secure Europe in a better word - The European Security Strategy, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, (accessed January 2012).
6  Radoslav SIKORSKI, ”The Eu’s ’Eastern Partnership’ is Key to Relations with Russia”, 
Europe’s World, summer 2009, pp. 38-41. 
7  Hannes Svoboda (Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Rapporteur 
for the new EU-Russia Agreement). 2011. Interviewed by the author. Tape recording, December 
8. The European Parliament, Brussels.
8  Irina KOBRINSKAYA, ”The Post-Soviet Space: from the USSR to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and Beyond”, in Katlijn MALFLIET, Lien VERPOEST, Evgeny VINOKUROV, 
The CIS, the EU and Russia. The Challenges of Integration, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 20.
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instance, if Ukraine adopts EU standards, Russian business in Ukraine will be forced 
to become ”EU compatible”, creating a growing Russian constituency in favour of 
Russia adopting EU rules and standards1. In this way, Kiev could have an increased 
role in deepening the linkage between Russia and the West. While a higher linkage to 
the EU will allow Brussels to increase its leverage towards Russia2. 
Within this context, Russia is trying to ”protect” itself by establishing its own 
version of a ”Monroe doctrine” in the CIS region and ”by establishing a tighter 
federation highly dependent on the Russian centre but without necessarily expanding 
Russian territory”3, the efforts of rebuilding Greater Russia can be seen though as 
expansionist, but not in the traditional geo-political sense of acquiring new territories, 
but rather of denying others influence4. It is not the first time when Russia had such 
reactions to EU’s influence in an area where the Kremlin has some interests. The peak 
of Belarusian-Russian integration, the Union State agreement, was concluded in the 
same year of the NATO strikes on Serbia that were widely contested both in Russia 
and Belarus5. 
Russia’s policy based on ”spheres of influence” is contesting the fourth 
EU-Russia Common Space, especially the Common Space of External Security6. 
Brussels rejects the idea of a Russian ”privileged sphere of interests” in the region, 
as the EU needs Russia to accept that the countries of the shared neighbourhood 
have the right to choose their own way and foreign policy. The EU seeks a European 
”postmodern” security community across the wider Europe and the creation of 
a ”ring of well governed countries” to the East7. And Brussels is implementing 
this through ”soft and smart power”, projecting security and creating prosperity. 
EU strives for the harmonization of states’ legal systems with the EU’s acquis 
communautaire and for creating suitable conditions for political integration through 
shared values8.
From its launch, the Kremlin was very skeptical toward the Eastern Partnership. 
However, instead of considering the Partnership or any other European initiative 
towards the former Soviet republics as a threat, Russia should see the EU’s engagement 
in its eastern neighbourhood as an opportunity rather than a challenge. A hypothetical 
EU membership for Ukraine, for instance, would create a powerful impulse for the 
deepening of Russian-European cooperation. Then, in today’s globalised world, 
1  Marius VAHL, ”EU-Russia Relations in EU Neighbourhood Policies”, in Katlijn 
MALFLIET, Lien VERPOEST, Evgeny VINOKUROV, The CIS, the EU and Russia…cit., p. 135.
2  About linkage and leverage see Steven LEVITSKY, Lucan A. WAY, ”Linkage Versus 
Leverage. Rethinking the International Dimension of the Regime Change”, Comparative Politics, 
vol. 38, no. 4, July 2006, pp. 379-400.
3  Bertil NYGREN, The Rebuilding of Greater...cit., p. 230.
4  Ibidem, p. 249.
5  Lien VERPOEST, ”Parallels and Divergences in Integration in Ukraine and Belarus”, in 
in Katlijn MALFLIET, Lien VERPOEST, Evgeny VINOKUROV, The CIS, the EU and Russia…cit., 
p. 164.
6  Derek AVERE, ”Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ’Shared Neighbourhood’”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, no. 10, 2009, p. 1702.
7  Ibidem, p. 1690.
8  Sergey TUMANOV, Alexander GASPARISHVILI, Ekaterina ROMANOVA, ”Russia–EU 
Relations, or How the Russians Really View the EU”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics, vol. 27, no. 1, 2011, p. 130.
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Europe can only be secure if everybody is secure1. The resulting strengthening of ties 
between Russia and the West would be a step forward for the whole of Europe, which 
is in the interest of Russian people2. 
Conclusions
The European Union is strongly interested in deepening and widening cooperation 
with Russia. However, the rule of law and the democratic rights cannot be set aside 
during the dialogue with Moscow. This is one of the main explanations why the new 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is still under question. Until the Kremlin 
is ready to become ”more European” with regard to its internal and foreign policy 
and without implementing the four ”common spaces”, especially the common space 
of freedom, security and justice, Russia cannot be a reliable partner or become part 
of the community of European values and will only superficially participate in the 
European integration process3. Respect for human rights is at the very hart of the EU 
project and should be seen to be a core element of its foreign policy as well – without 
that the EU can have not soft power4. Or, the soft power is the essence of EU’s foreign 
policy. 
Russia should also stop perceiving EU policies toward former Soviet republics as 
a threat to its interests. As both Brussels and Moscow seek a stable neighbourhood, 
the European initiatives should not be perceived as challenges, but as opportunities 
for further cooperation. On the other side, with pressure on its southern and eastern 
flank, Russia will need a powerful international ally, and with reluctance to move 
closer to the USA, the EU might be the only choice. The EU-Russia partnership holds 
a lot of potential for a win-win situation. Both continue to need each other: Russia to 
avoid isolation and export its goods, the EU to secure its energy supplies and stability 
on its Eastern borders5. 
Moscow and Brussels need each other economically, yet Russia’s energy policy, 
authoritarianism, and involvement in the affairs of its neighbours have all limited 
its ability to seek fuller integration with the evolving institutional web of Europe6. 
If the EU wants to have Russia as a law-abiding, reliable, and eventually democratic 
neighbour it must build its partnership with Russia on the same foundations that 
made European integration a success – interdependence based on stable rules, 
transparency, symmetrical relations and consensus7. Moscow has to choose whether 
it wants an economic union with former Soviet republics, or a common economic 
space with Europe. And we can see that the Kremlin needs the EU more than the EU 
needs Russia. The world economic crisis hit hard Russia’s economy, which is based on 
raw material exports, highlighting the need for advanced machinery and technology, 
available in the West, especially in the EU.
1  Richard G. WHITMAN, Stefan WOLFF, The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 75.
2  Andreas UMLAND, ”EU and NATO Policies…cit”.
3  Ibidem.
4  Richard G. WHITMAN, Stefan WOLFF, The European Neighbourhood...cit., p. 87.
5  Tom CASIER, ”The Rise of Energy to... cit.”, p. 86.
6  Jeffrey MANKOFF, Russian Foreign Policy…cit., p. 182.
7  Marc LEONARD, Nicu POPESCU, ”A Power Audit of…cit.”, p. 6.
483
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XII • no. 3 • 2012
Between Interdependence and Strategic Interests 
With respect to the EU, the member states should consolidate their solidarity. 
Becoming a single entity, at least in energy matters, will allow them to protect better 
their interests while negotiating with Russia. The Kremlin will never see the EU as 
real global protagonist if the EU members will not have a unified position towards 
Moscow. Taken individually, the EU members can hardly face Russia’s pressure, 
the EU as a united actor, however is a force that put Russia in respect. The bilateral 
negotiations undermine the core of EU’s common strategy and deprives the Union of 
his main force: the unity.
